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ABSTRACT:
This paper analyzes the ethical rules applicable to attorney conflicts of
interest as default terms which the legal system supplies in the absence of
complete contracting by the attorney and client. Following an approach
that is standard in the literature, we model the attorney-client relationship
as an agency contract characterized by information and monitoring
difficulties. We conclude that, in general, a regime that grants the client
the right to bar subsequent, conflicting representation of other parties by
the attorney, subject to ex post renegotiation by the attorney and client,
represents an optimal approach to the problem. Economic theory predicts,
however, that there is a threshold of harm to the client, below which the
attorney should be allowed to represent another party without obtaining
the first client's consent. In general, the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopt a regime of
conflicts regulation that is quite consistent with economic theory. We sug-
gest that the bar has an incentive to adopt efficient rules in this area be-
cause its interests are closely aligned with the public's: both have an
interest in facilitating efficient contracting between attorney and
client-the bar, to increase profits; the public, to reduce costs.
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST REGULATION
The concept of legal "ethics" is deeply embedded in the notion of law
as a learned profession. Lawyers are expected to behave in accordance with
a high standard of morality. Ethical issues are grist for the mills of popular
television series and best-selling mysteries.
The concept of "ethics" carries a powerful normative connotation; it
suggests that legal ethics has a large moral component and might in fact
be seen as an applied branch of moral philosophy. Consistent with this
normative thrust, the system of legal ethics is often understood as a moral
code for the legal profession Yet there is an undeniably powerful eco-
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nomic element in legal ethics rules as well. These rules control the basic
elements of the business of lawyering, from entry into the profession (li-
censure), to the types of market development which the attorney can un-
dertake (advertising or solicitation), to the terms of the contracts with
customers that the lawyer can negotiate (retainers). As ethics scholar
Stephen Gillers observed, law is a regulated industry.2 Among the princi-
pal regulations that control the activities of this industry are the rules of
legal ethics. Thus, while ethical rules undoubtedly have a moral compo-
nent, they also have an economic function.
A superficial application of economic principles might suggest that
ethics rules are likely to be uniformly inefficient. For the most part, these
rules are promulgated by the organized bar without substantial input from
other interests. In particular, clients (other than large organizations with
in-house attorneys) are not strongly represented in the councils which
formulate bar rules. One might argue, therefore, that ethics rules represent
a naked exercise of guild power, serving the interests of lawyers at the
expense of clients or the general public.3 But this would be an
oversimplification. The organized bar, which has principal responsibility
for drafting the rules of legal ethics, can enhance its profits in at least two
ways: first, by limiting the supply of legal services available in the mar-
ketplace (mainly by restricting entry into the practice of law); and second,
by adopting economically efficient rules that reduce costs (in part, by
lowering the contracting costs between lawyers and clients). Either a
reduction in costs or a decrease in supply will increase the profitability of
legal services, and by engaging in both techniques simultaneously, the bar
4
can enhance profits still more and do so over the long run.
The efficiency implications of the supply-restricting and cost-reducing
strategies utilized by the organized bar are complex and require careful
case-by-case analysis. As a broad generalization, however, it would appear
that while supply-reducing rules are likely to be inefficient on balance
(because the welfare loss associated with the reduction in supply is greater
than the welfare benefit that might be achieved by providing quality
assurance), cost-reducing rules are likely, in many cases, to be efficient (be-
cause the bar's interest in reducing the cost of providing legal services
2. See generally Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics (4th
ed. 1995).
3. A charge frequently found, in one form or another, in the commentaries. See, e.g.,
Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639, 655-56 (1981)
(arguing that the model rules reflect the interest of the elite bar); Stephen Gillers, Can a Good
Lauyer Be a Bad Person.', 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1011, 1017 (1986) (referring to ethics regulations as
"narrow and self-interested resolutions"); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concepts of
Professional Responsibility, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 702, 738-39 (1977) (discussing lawyers' self-interest in
ethical duties); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589,
611 (1985) (arguing that the bar rules serve guild purposes).
4. Note, however, that the increased profits the bar can obtain through lowering con-
tracting costs will eventually dissipate as a result of competition unless they are coupled with
supply restrictions.
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aligns well with the public's interest in efficient contracting). Thus, while
some ethics rules can indeed be understood as serving the interest of the
organized bar at the expense of social wealth, other rules, arguably, can be
justified on economic grounds. Efficient ethics rules are those that reduce
contracting costs between lawyers and their clients by supplying reasonable
terms to which lawyer and client would agree, in most cases, if they were to
bargain over the issue.
The codes of professional responsibility, in other words, contain a
number of "gap-filling" or "default" rules that supply terms to an attorney-
client contract. Among the most important of such rules are those related
to conflicts of interest.
In part, our purpose is to identify an efficiency rationale for certain
rules that have heretofore generally been analyzed from other, principally
moral and ethical, perspectives. We believe that economic analysis can pro-
vide a satisfactory and coherent explanation for the structure of rules that
we observe in the legal ethics area. Through the economic lens the rules in
question can be seen as supplying reasonable implied terms to the
attorney-client contract in an environment characterized by information
asymmetries, agency costs, dangers of ex post opportunism, and associated
costs of monitoring and enforcement.5
A second purpose of this paper is to suggest an economic framework
for interpreting the gap-filling rules in cases of ambiguity. Once the
economic function of these gap-filling rules is clarified, they can be inter-
preted in a fashion that is likely to enhance the efficiency of the provision
of legal services. Efficiency-based interpretations turn out to be generally
consistent with reasonable moral intuitions, but they are, in some cases, at
variance with the constructions that courts or commentators have adopted.
Thus, economic analysis of the gap-filling rules of attorney ethics may
provide guidance for the interpretation of the rules of legal ethics in hard
cases.
This paper is structured as follows. Part I presents the lawyer-client
relationship as an agency relationship with problems similar, in many
respects, to those arising in many other settings, but with a number of
features that are not present, or not present in equal degree, in other
agency relationships. Part I then discusses the theory of gap-filling in the
law-and-economics literature, and considers the problems of agency and
gap-filling in the special context of the attorney-client relationship. Part II
analyzes the conflicts of interest rules from the perspective of legal-
economic theory and offers theoretical reasons why the rules might be gen-
erally consonant with economic efficiency, notwithstanding the fact that
they have been adopted by the bar to regulate its own behavior. The paper
closes with a brief conclusion.
5. For another commentator who found that the conflicts of interest rules seem to work
quite well when viewed from the lens of economic analysis, see Richard A. Epstein, The Legal
Regulation of Laurjers' Conflicts of Interest, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 579, 582 (1992).
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THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION
A. Legal Representation as an Agency Relationship
Lawyers function as agents for their clients. Often this is true in a
technical sense; for example, when the attorney is conducting negotiations,
executing documents, or otherwise acting on the client's behalf in a legal
matter, he or she functions as the client's legal agent. The very concept of
"representation" implies agency: the attorney champions the client before a
tribunal or in some less formal setting and, thus, acts on behalf of the
client's interests.
All agency relationships carry the possibility that the agent will be
unfaithful. 6 The legal profession is no exception. The possibility that
attorneys will serve their own interests at the expense of their clients' is
widely recognized by society at large, as evidenced by the plethora of
lawyer jokes that have been popular since at least the Middle Ages. Lawyers
may overbill or pad their fees, settle litigation on terms less favorable than
they could have obtained with greater effort," conduct class action and
derivative litigation as "entrepreneurs" interested in maximizing their own
income,9 and even shade their legal advice out of motives of self-
interest 0 These aspects of the attorney as a self-interested agent may
occasionally encounter criticism in the scholarly literature,1" but even
critics of the pure agency model generally concede that the attorney-client
6. As one of us has argued, this point was well known (and regulated by legal norms)
even in preliterate societies. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Contracts of Genesis, 22J. Legal Stud. 15, 34
(1993) (arguing that many biblical narratives should be understood, in part, as legal texts).
7. See Lisa Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659, 705-20 (1990) (noting a study
in which nearly all lawyers interviewed reported engaging in some deceptive billing practices).
8. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16J. Legal Stud. 189, 200-02
(1987) (explaining different theories of attorney settlement methods).
9. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs' Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of the Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L Rev.
669, 670 (1986) (arguing that certain legal rules create an incentive for attorneys to maximize
their own wealth); Jonathan 1R Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991) (explaining the class action attorney as an entrepreneur conducting
business in the American legal system).
10. See Donald Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results:The Role of Lanyers
in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. LJ. 375 (1997) (noting that attorneys may
overstate legal risks to clients in order to protect their own interests).
11. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer. Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession
(1993) (emphasizing need for "practical wisdom" in lawyering and decrying increased
commercialization of the profession); Charles Fried, The Lauyer as Friend: The Moral Foun-
dations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1976) (stating that lawyers can serve as
special-purpose "friends" who can enhance and protect client autonomy in stressful
situations); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1990) (exploring
and justifying instances when lawyer independence should be encouraged); William H. Simon,
Ethical Discretion in Lawysring, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083 (1988) (asserting that attorneys should
have discretion to make ethical decisions for clients).
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relationship has substantial elements of agency; their objections tend to go
to the exclusivity of the agency model rather than its overall descriptive
accuracy.
The attorney-client relationship is also an agency relationship in
economic theory.'2 Every time one person (the agent) acts on behalf of
another person (the principal), the agent has an incentive to shirk or serve
his own interests, simply because the agent does not capture the full
benefit of his labor. In legal representation, as in other areas, the only way
to truly eliminate the agency problem is to eliminate the agency: if the
client elects to represent himself in a legal matter, the client will capture
all the benefits of the representation. But eliminating the agency problem
by self-representation often creates greater costs than it saves, because the
client is unlikely to be as skilled or knowledgeable at law as the attorney.
Furthermore, even if the client possesses the requisite skills, the client may
suffer from distorted judgment because his or her own self-interest is
involved. No matter how loyal a person engaged in self-representation may
be to his or her own interests, he or she will not be better off if the
process generates a fool for a client.
Rather than eliminating the agency arrangement, private actors
attempt to minimize these inevitable costs of agency by reducing the
agent's incentives to act in ways that conflict with the principal's interests.
Incentives can be changed in three principal ways, with varied effectiveness
and associated costs. The most direct method to change the agent's
incentives is for the principal to monitor the agent's behavior and to
intervene with an appropriate sanction in the event of shirking or other
disloyal behavior. With perfect monitoring, the sanction for misbehavior is
set at a level that removes the incentive that the agent would otherwise
have to shirk. Moreover, because the agent understands that he is being
perfectly monitored and will suffer the sanction if he shirks, it will rarely, if
12. Leading articles in the area of agency theory in economics include Sanford Grossman
& Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 Econometrica 7 (1983)
(describing a simple approach for analyzing the principal-agency cost minimization problem
using computational methods); Milton Harris & Arthur Raviv, Optimal Incentive Contracts with
Imperfect Information, 20 J. Econ. Theory 231 (1979) (describing a theory of optimal contracts
in the employment, or agency, context); Bengt Homstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-
Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, J.L Econ. & Org., Fall 1991,
at 24 (analyzing a number of variants of a linear principal-agent model); Stephen A. Ross, The
Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1973, at 134 (examining
the canonical agency problem using von-Neumann Morgenstern utility functions); Steven
Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, Bell J. Econ., Spring
1979, at 55 (studying arrangements concerning the payment of a fee by a principal to his
agents).
For an interesting paper modeling some forms of representation as means by which the
attorney as agent can enhance cooperation between disputing parties, see Ronald J. Gilson &
Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in
Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509 (1994). For papers applying economic agency theory to the
attorney-client relationship, see, for example, Coffee, supra note 9; Epstein, supra note 5;
Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 10; Macey & Miller, supra note 9.
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ever, be necessary for the principal to actually administer the sanction. The
mere presence of the sanction will be enough to deter the agent from
shirking in the first place. In the real world, of course, monitoring is never
perfect and incentives can never be set at the precise level necessary to
deter shirking; as a result, agents do shirk and intervention is required
from time to time.
The second method of controlling agency costs is for the principal to
alter the agent's incentives without ongoing monitoring. The principal
selects an objective measure of output and rewards (or punishes) the agent
depending on performance. Under very restrictive conditions-the
principal perfectly defines the desired objective, the agent completely
controls whether or not the defined result is obtained, and the structure of
rewards and punishments is set so that the agent never has an incentive to
shirk, even though the agent is not being watched-the parties could, in
theory, perfectly control agency costs without any monitoring of the
agent's actual behavior. Again, however, in the real world it is impossible
to establish a perfect structure of incentives based on output: there will
inevitably be overdeterrence or underdeterrence; it will be difficult, in
most cases, to define the desired performance objective with precision; and
the agent will have incentives to shirk when the agent believes he can get
away with it.
The final method for controlling agency costs uses the sanctioning
apparatus of the state. State intervention can reduce the agent's incentives
to shirk by threatening the agent with penalties for doing so and by
establishing norms that discourage shirking even if the parties have not
explicitly specified terms in their contracts that anticipate the agency
problem. State intervention can reduce transaction costs by relieving the
parties of the need to negotiate their individual contracts; it also might
have a valuable in terrorem effect by threatening the agent with an
extreme sanction for noncompliance. However, state intervention is subject
to drawbacks equally or even more serious than the private mechanisms
discussed above: the state may overdeter or underdeter by threatening a
sanction that is too harsh or too lenient under the circumstances; it may
fail to detect violations or may punish behavior which is, in fact, appro-
priate; and it may impose inefficient conditions on the parties which they
might not have agreed to through private bargaining.
All forms of altering the agent's incentives to overcome the agency
problem are, therefore, problematic and costly. The problem for economic
theory is to devise an approach that minimizes the sum of all the
costs-including the residual costs of shirking by the agent.
Although the attorney-client relationship has the same structure as
other agency relationships, it differs from some other agency relationships
in the degree to which it is resistant to many of the incentive-altering
techniques that reduce (but never eliminate) the agency problem in other
settings. The main source of this resistance in the attorney-client
relationship is the severe informational asymmetry between the parties.
The lawyer possesses a store of specialized knowledge, skill, and judgment
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that the client lacks.'3 Because clients often cannot distinguish good legal
work from bad, the client will rarely be an effective monitor of the
attorney's behavior (unless the client is a sophisticated party, such as a firm
that employs its own in-house counsel). The client will have only a vague
idea of how many hours the attorney should spend on a project under an
hourly fee arrangement, whether the attorney has conducted the legal re-
search well or poorly, and whether the attorney is making good arguments
or bad ones. Furthermore, when the client has only a small stake in the
controversy, as in some class action or shareholders' derivative litigation,
any potential monitoring role the client may have becomes vestigial at
best."'4
Agency costs in the attorney-client relationship are also, in most
settings, resistant to the use of direct incentives based on performance.
Except in cases where results can be obtained reliably and with cer-
tainty-for example, a simple incorporation or a name change-it will
ordinarily be impossible to specify an objective performance measure that
the attorney must achieve in order to obtain a given reward or to avoid a
given sanction. Even good attorneys lose cases, and bad ones win them.'5
Moreover, any measure of attorney compensation based on outcomes
creates a form of reverse agency problem, in that the attorney's ability to
predict whether he or she will achieve a given result depends crucially on
the accuracy of the information that the client provides. Just as
informational problems hamstring the client in judging the attorney's skills
and competence, the attorney's inability to get complete and reliable
information from the client about the nature and background of the
representation may impede his or her ability to provide effective
representation. Incentive problems can be mitigated through contingent
fee arrangements, which are a partial sale of the claim to the attorney, but
such problems inevitably may remain as long as the attorney has no more
than a partial interest in the litigation.
These difficulties with private mechanisms for controlling agency costs
suggest the possible utility of government regulation. The government may
be able to act as a more accurate monitor or to impose more effective
penalties than would be available under a regime of private contract. The
government, moreover, may be able to respond to the externalities (if any)
13. This point is frequently stressed in the literature. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The
Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective 49 Md. L. Rev. 869, 884-88 (1990)
(noting that attorneys possess specialized knowledge but positing that information asymmetry
between lawyers and clients may be decreasing); Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 10
(noting that attorneys have the ability to overstate legal risks because clients lack the ability to
evaluate risks accurately on their own); Miller, supra note 8 (stating that even though clients
have formal legal control over settlement, the attorney's specialized knowledge gives him or
her a degree of de facto power).
14. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 667-68; Macey & Miller, supra note 9, at 8.
15. Despite the difficulties in specifying an objective measure of performance, some firms
engage in "value billing" for major transactions, a system in which the fee is based on the
value produced by the legal services rather than the time spent performing the services.
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that are created as a consequence of the attorney-client relationship.
However, government intervention in the attorney-client context is also
problematic for a number of reasons. Because of the inevitably fact-specific
and individualized nature of most legal representation, the government, as
a disinterested third party, is unlikely to be an effective monitor of the
parties' conduct. To the extent that the government actually influences the
terms of the attorney-client relationship by direct regulation (for example,
by prohibiting or limiting certain contingent arrangements), rather than
merely enforcing the parties' private agreement, the government may
impose conditions that may not reflect the parties' best interests. Gov-
ernment agencies are often subject to budget constraints that may hamper
their ability to function as effective regulators. And, government
intervention in the attorney-client relationship is especially problematic
because the assistance of counsel is a right which the citizen enjoys in
order, in part, to obtain protection against government abuse. Thus,
government control over the attorney-client relationship is fraught with as
many (or possibly more) difficulties as private control through contract.
B. The Contractual Approach To Agency Costs
The difficulty inherent in government control over the attorney-client
relationship suggests that, in the absence of significant externalities, the
government's principal role should be limited to enforcing the parties'
contract. The attorney and client are better situated to control agency costs
by private agreement. However, in many cases, the parties' agreement will
be ambiguous as applied to a particular fact pattern, or the parties may
have failed to address an issue altogether. In such cases, efficiency
considerations suggest that the government's role should ordinarily be to
supply reasonable "gap-filling" or default terms that the parties likely would
have agreed to if they had bargained over the issue ex ante.1r
The efficiency benefits of contractual default rules are numerous.
When the marginal costs of drafting customized rules to govern the
attorney-client relationship exceed the marginal benefits, there is an
efficiency gain when the state can supply standardized terms to which, in
16. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 Yale LJ. 87, 87-101 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules 101 Yale LJ. 729, 729-32 (1992); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter
Amendments, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1820 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close
Corporations and Ageny Costs, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 271 (1986); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract
Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261 (1985); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic
Theoy of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale LJ. 615 (1990); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick?:
The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 Yale UJ. 1249, 1250-59 (1996);
Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 QJ. Econ. 121 (1984). For a
wide-ranging philosophical treatment of the issue of default rules, see David Charny,
Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815,
1815-17 (1991).
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general, both parties to a contract could agree ex ante.'7 Another benefit
of contractual default rules is that they can reduce search costs that parties
would otherwise incur in determining the contractual terms offered by
different service providers. By standardizing the terms, the law facilitates
comparison shopping along a few dimensions of quality. This standardiza-
tion can be especially important in inefficient markets, where quality
dimensions of a product or service may not be captured in a public,
observable market price.' 8
Whereas the superior efficiency of individually drafted and
standardized gap-filling terms is usually clear, mandatory rules can be justi-
fied on efficiency grounds in a few settings. Most importantly, where third
party effects are present, it may be appropriate to trump the agreement of
the parties in order to control externalities.' 9 The law may also choose
not to enforce the apparent agreement of the parties if there is evidence
that it does not reflect a true meeting of the minds, as in the case of
mistake or incapacity. In the case of a contract between an attorney and an
unsophisticated party, a court might conclude that terms drafted by the
attorney that are adverse to the client do not represent the true agreement
of the parties, and the court might then supply reasonable default terms to
fill the resulting gap.
C. Complete and Incomplete Contracts in the Attorney-Client Relationship
In this section, we consider the implications of agency problems in
legal representation as they relate to conflicts of interest. We present the
conflicts of interest rules as gap-fillers applicable when the attorney-client
contract lacks express agreements on the question in point.
2
17. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 16, at 286-87.
18. In securities markets, for example, the market price does reflect a discount for
differences in governance structures, thus making standardized governance terms less
desirable for publicly traded firms than, say, for small or nonpublic firms. See Larry E.
Ribstein, Statutoy Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs, 73 Wash. U. L.Q.
369, 375 (1995).
19. See id. at 378.
20. We exclude from the analysis here, and throughout the paper, the possibility that the
attorney-client relationship will have external effects on third parties that cannot be controlled
entirely by means of a contract between attorney and client, even if the contract is perfect and
complete. This exclusion is intended to simplify the analysis, which, even excluding
externalities, turns out to be surprisingly complex. A more complete theory of the conflicts of
interest would have to deal with what are undoubtedly significant third party effects in the
attorney-client relationship. For literature that does consider external effects in certain aspects
of the attorney-client relationship, see, for example, Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge,
Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 261 (1993) (discussing when and if legal
sanctions are socially desirable and how sanctions affect legal advice); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Legal Advice About Acts Already Committed; 10 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 149 (1990) (arguing
that legal advice can be irrelevant, socially desirable, or socially undesirable); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desir-
ability, 102 Harv. L Rev. 565 (1989) (discussing generally whether to seek legal advice); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Private Vesus Socially Optimal Provision of Legal Advice, 8 J.L. Econ. &
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For starters, it is easy to see why an attorney's conflict of interest
represents a form of agency problem. Two main agency problems can arise
as a result of an attorney representing clients with conflicting interests
either consecutively or concurrently. First, in consecutive representations,
the attorney (A) may learn confidential information about a client (Cl)
during the course of the representation that he can then use to Cl's
disadvantage when representing another party with competing interests
(C2, C3, etc.). Ordinarily, clients do not want their secrets revealed, and, if
A discloses Cl's secrets to C2 in order to enhance A's own stature or
increase his fees in the second representation, C1 obviously has legitimate
concern. Second, in concurrent conflict situations, the attorney who takes
on C2 may reduce the vigor of representation of his current client C1.
Because the attorney favors his own interest over those of C1, a form of
agency cost results.2' C1 will inevitably object to A representing C2, even if
C2 has interests that conflict with Cl's. But if A gains more from the C2
representation than C1 loses, a positive joint product results from the
undertaking, and the parties (A and Cl) may be able to share the gains
from that product, thus making themselves both better off.
To illustrate these points, we first consider the problem of conflict of
interest in a perfect contracting environment and then move to an
environment of imperfect contracting which more closely approximates the
world in which attorneys and clients actually function. We then consider
the efficiency consequences of a number of possible default rules within
the imperfect contracting setting.
1. Perfect Contracting Environment
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. A and C1 are
negotiating for a retainer agreement at time t. A has no conflicting
representation at this time. At some point in the future, t4, however, there
is an even chance that A will have the opportunity to undertake a
conflicting representation for either C2 or C3, thus imposing costs on C1
which would not be imposed if the first representation had never occurred.
Twenty-five percent of the time A has the opportunity to represent C2,
earning a profit of $10 and imposing a cost of $15 on Cl; 25% of the time
A has the opportunity to represent C3, earning a profit of $8 and imposing
a cost of $2 on C1 (assume for convenience that all amounts are
discounted to present value and that A earns all the surplus generated by
the representation of C2 or C3). These potential losses to C1 are due to
Org. 306 (1992) (suggesting specific situations when ex ante legal advice is appropriate);
Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decisions to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desir-
ability, and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. Legal Stud. 123 (1988) (discussing generally
whether to seek legal advice).
21. Clients may also have an interest in maintaining the integrity of the work-product
which their attorneys generate. For example, clients may legitimately expect that an attorney
who drafts a contractual term for them will not turn around and seek to nullify the force of
the same term during representation of a subsequent party.
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the following factors: A's prior familiarity with Cl's case, which may make
him a more informed or effective advocate than other attorneys; A's
willingness to use attorney-client confidences obtained in the initial repre-
sentation to the detriment of Cl; or, if the representation of C1 is ongoing,
the reduced vigor of A's representation of C1 that results from the exis-
tence of divided loyalties. Faced with these possibilities, A and C1 have the
option of either barring all conflicting representation or permitting all.
It might seem from this scenario that A should be absolutely
precluded from the subsequent representations of C2 and C3. After all, the
existence of the first representation might be used to the detriment of Cl.
Why should attorneys, unlike other agents, be allowed to behave in a
disloyal way that imposes real costs on their clients-costs, moreover, that
presumably benefit a party with whom C1 has an adversarial relationship?
It does not require much thought to realize that this intuition is false. As
the following table illustrates, the parties are jointly better off if A is
allowed to undertake the conflicting representation:
No Conflict C2 C3
50% 25% 25% Net
C1 $0.00 ($3.75) ($0.50) ($4.25)
A $0.00 $2.50 $2.00 $4.50
Joint $0.00 ($1.25) $1.50 $0.25
Thus, A and C1 make themselves jointly better off ex ante by agreeing to
allow the subsequent representations-by a total of $.25 on an expected
value basis. If it were possible to specify a complete contract with respect to
the possible future states of the world, A would be able to compensate C1
by paying some amount for the right to engage in a conflicting representa-
tion, an offer which would be in Cl's interest to accept.
It might, nevertheless, seem that regardless of whether the parties
benefit ex ante, the second representation should be precluded because at
time t, C2 and C3 will have a choice of other counsel. Given the fact that
C2 and C3 can always (or nearly always) find some other lawyer able to
conduct the representation, why should society allow.A to represent C2 and
C3 at time t1 when that is directly harmful to Cl? The answer is that C1
would agree to the subsequent representation ex ante because A would pay
an amount sufficient to induce him to do so. But implicit in the example is
also the assumption that A would earn enough from the subsequent
representation. If A is going to make no more than other attorneys in the
marketplace from the representation, and if the legal marketplace is
efficient, A would not pay C2 for the right to engage in the subsequent
representation because A could earn just as much from other legal work
without having to pay the bonus.
The fact that A earns a value in the second representation does not,
however, make the subsequent representation a bad deal for either party
or for society as a whole. Attorneys do earn rents (or quasi-rents) for
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specialized skills, contacts, and knowledge, based, in part, on the attorney's
past experience. Thus, it appears quite plausible that an attorney at time t,
having previously worked for C1 on a matter with a legal or factual profile
similar to the pending matter, would be able to charge a higher fee than
other attorneys.
But what if A's ability to earn profits in the second matter is, in fact,
the direct result of his willingness to pass on to C2 or C3 sensitive
information obtained from C1 on a confidential basis? The possibility that
such conduct will occur does not make it irrational for C1 to consent ex
ante to the subsequent representation. Effectively, C1 consents to the
appropriation and adverse use of his proprietary information, because C1
receives, in exchange, a greater value than that which she is relinquishing.
C1 essentially sells information to A. Social welfare would be served by
permitting A to use Us confidences adversely to C1 in this situation:
because both C1 and A are better off, and because no one else is worse off,
social wealth is increased.
The example so far assumes that the probabilities of A working on a
matter for C2 or C3 are fixed and unchanging. Let us relax this as-
sumption in favor of the more realistic one that, unless the contract
contains protections restraining A's conduct, Cl's agreement ex ante to A's
subsequent conflict of interest representation will affect the probability that
such a representation will occur. In other words, if A is permitted to do so,
he is likely actively to seek the work that generates the highest profits; he
will, therefore, seek to represent C2 and C3, rather than other clients, and,
between these two, he will more aggressively seek out the work for C2
which pays $10 than the work for C3 which pays only $8. How does this
change the analysis of the efficiency implications? As long as the parties
can engage in complete, costless contracting, the analysis does not change
substantially. In a perfect contracting environment, C1 will know that
consent will increase the likelihood that A will in fact engage in a con-
flicting subsequent representation, and will demand compensation for the
increased risk-compensation that A will be willing to pay as long as a
positive bargaining range exists.
Assume, for example, that if C1 consents ex ante to the subsequent
representation on the above facts, the probabilities change so that there
exists only a 20% chance that A will not engage in conflicting representa-
tion. Assume also that if A does engage in conflicting representation, there
is an 80% chance that A will work for C2, earning a profit of $10 and
imposing a cost of $15 on C1, and a 20% chance that A will work for C3,
earning a profit of $8 and imposing a cost of $2 on Cl.
No Conflict C2 C3
20% 64% 16% Net
C1 $0.00 ($9.60) ($0.32) ($9.92)
A $0.00 $6.40 $1.28 $7.68
Joint $0.00 ($3.20) $0.96 ($2.24)
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In this case, the parties would contract for A not to engage in the
subsequent representation, because the joint product of the subsequent
representation is negative. However, hypotheticals could easily be devised
in which, despite the increased likelihood that A will engage in subsequent,
conflicting representation if allowed to do so, the joint product between A
and C1 would remain positive. In these cases the parties would agree ex
ante to allow the representation.
Note that where the parties' joint product is negative as a result of the
enhanced likelihood that A will engage in a conflict of interest, the parties
would still contract to permit some subsequent representation if they could
specify in advance the representations in which A could engage. The C2
representation in the above example represents a negative joint product
for A and C1, but the C3 representation has a positive product: A wins
more than C1 loses. If, therefore, we relax the assumption that the parties
cannot determine in advance which future representation the attorney is
allowed to undertake, it becomes apparent that the parties will permit
some future conflicts of interest, even while prohibiting others: A and C1
would agree to allow A to represent C3, but not C2. This has the added
benefit of regulating attorney opportunism while permitting value-
increasing conflict of interest representations in the future.
2. Imperfect Contracting Environment
In light of the previous discussion, it seems clear that conflicts of
interest would not be problematic if contracting between attorney and
client were complete and costless. In the real world, however, contracting
is neither complete nor cosless,n and several practical difficulties might
affect the nature of the terms of an attorney-client contract that deals with
conflicts of interest in a world of second-best. First is the problem of
complexity. It is often impossible to specify in advance how different future
states of the world should be handled, or even to predict with any degree
of certainty what those future states would be. This does not mean that
specificity is impossible; in some cases, A and C1 can foresee a possible
subsequent representation and, having foreseen it, can determine how it is
to be handled. But in the vast majority of cases, future events are not
foreseeable. As a result, the attorney-client contract will inevitably be
incomplete. The best course of action is for the parties to specify in broad
terms what they view as the most important factors; however, such terms
are often so uncertain as to be subject to difficulties of future interpreta-
22. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233, 235-58 (1979) (discussing the complexities of
contract law and its associated transaction costs). The economics of incomplete contracts are
explored in Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995); Cham)y, supra note
16, at 1819; Goetz & Scott, supra note 16, at 270; SanfordJ. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The
Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theoy of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691
(1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Fnm, 98J. Pol. Econ.
1119 (1990).
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tion.
Complexity is particularly problematic in light of the danger of
opportunism inherent in these types of contractsY In the right circum-
stances, either A or C1 can act opportunistically-by seeking an
unbargained-for-consideration ex post. For example, in the case of an
attorney, A may seek out representations that are adverse to C1 in cases
where A and C1 would not have agreed to allow the new representation ex
ante. Clients, too, might behave opportunistically by attempting to prevent
attorneys from representing new clients in situations where A and C1
would have agreed to allow the representation ex ante. Because it is
impossible to specify all future states of the world in which opportunistic
behavior is an option, it will be difficult for A and C1 to control all future
opportunism by detailed contractual provisions.
A problem related to complexity is that of quantification. In actual
representation settings, A and C1 may not be able to quantify, with even a
pretense of precision, either the amount of their respective gains and
losses in the event of a future representation by A of a client with a
conflicting interest or the probability of the attorney undertaking such a
representation if allowed to do so. It may, accordingly, be exceedingly
difficult to settle on an amount of compensation that would cover Cl's
expected losses from such representation. The parties may, therefore, end
up more or less shooting in the dark, and, if they are risk averse, they will
end up worse off ex ante. They may decide that they prefer the relatively
certain world in which subsequent representation is prohibited to an
uncertain world in which subsequent representation is permitted, even if
there was a chance that they could both be better off in the second world
than in the first.
Finally, contracts between A and C1 regarding A's future behavior
suffer from difficulties in monitoring and enforcement. C1 does not watch
A on a day-to-day basis, especially after the relationship ends. C1 will thus
often have very limited ability to determine whether or not A is keeping his
promises regarding subsequent representation. Even in litigation, where
A's subsequent behavior is likely to be most easily observable, A may have
opportunities to provide advice behind the scenes, without publicly
disclosing his involvement. C1 might also seek to make enforcement
difficult; particularly, C1 might claim that her ex ante agreement to permit
subsequent conflicting representation was obtained without full disclosure,
and thus is unenforceable. Some courts are likely to view this argument
favorably given the differences in sophistication on matters of law that
ordinarily exist in the attorney-client relationship.24
23. For valuable discussion of the problem of opportunism in incompletely specified
contracts, see generally Timothy J. Muns, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contract 65
Minn. L. Rev. 521 (1981).
24. We are grateful to Ian Ayres for oral comments which suggest the possibility that ex
ante agreements between A and CI waiving C's rights on conflicts of interest might run into
enforcement problems in the courts.
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Accordingly, despite the fact that, in theory, there may be a
substantial number of cases in which A and C1 would agree, ex ante, to
allow A to represent conflicting interests, the difficulties in creating a
complete contract make it unlikely that the parties will, in fact, be able to
set forth an agreement with clear application to all, or even most, future
states of the world. In general, parties do not bargain with their attorneys
about the scope of future conflicts of interest. This is not always the case,
however, especially when the client is sophisticated in legal matters.2"
H. PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILrIY RULES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
These difficulties in drafting a contract that deals effectively with the
problem of conflicting representation ex ante suggest that the state might
have a positive role to play in supplying default terms that govern those
cases in which the parties have not clearly specified the full scope of their
agreement The following section considers a number of possible default
terms. Following prior work by Kaplow and Shavell,26 we divide the
possible approaches into property rules and liability rules. A property rule
gives the holder of the right the legal power to prevent any other party
from infringing on that right. A liability rule does not give the holder of
the right the legal power to prevent another party from infringing, but
instead gives the holder the right to obtain compensatory damages from
25. Stephen Gillers pointed out in comments on this paper that sophisticated clients and
sophisticated law firms do bargain for conflict rules that differ from the default rules in the
Model Rules:
[F]or example, a law firm that is particularly skilled in a specialized area of law will
demand that new clients seeking its services in that area agree to waiver of certain
prospective conflicts.... A firm with specialized expertise will often be able to
secure the waiver. Separately, substantial clients are able to negotiate for conflict
rules more demanding of a law firm than the default rules provide.
Memorandum from Stephen Gillers, Professor of Law, New York University, to Jonathan R.
Macey, J. DuPratt Professor of Law, Cornell University, and Geoffrey P. Miller, Professor of
Law, New York University (Aug. 8, 1996) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Memorandum
from Stephen Gillers].
26. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 715 (1996) (discussing the property rule/liability rule distinc-
tion, and arguing that generally, a person's possessory interest in a thing should be protected
by a property rule, whereas an interest in being protected from the effects of harmful
externalities should generally be governed by liability rules). For other recent works dealing
with property and liability rules, see generally Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between
Consensual and NonconsensualAdvantages of Liability Rules; 105 Yale LJ. 235 (1995); Ian Ayres &
Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining. Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale
Lj. 1027 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining]; Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply To Ayres and Talley, 105 Yale Lj. 221
(1995); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995); Ian Ayres & Jack Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auc-
tions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 Yale LJ. 703 (1996). The seminal work on
property and liability rules is Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral 85 Harv. L Rev. 1089 (1972).
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the infringing party. In operational terms, courts typically enforce property
rights through injunctive relief, whereas liability rules are typically enforced
through monetary damages.
Given the property rule/liability rule distinction, there are four
possibilities in the A-Cl relationship: (i) A has the right under a liability
regime; (ii) Cl has the right under a liability regime; (iii) C1 has the
property right; and (iv) A has the property right. The first of these
possibilities, however, is not relevant because the only question is A's right
to engage in the C2 representation, and under a liability regime there are
no situations in which Cl would owe money damages. Accordingly, we can
exclude the first case and consider the other three possibilities.
Before addressing this issue specifically, however, we briefly consider
another issue, which overlaps the property/liability distinction: the
appropriate scope of the property or liability rule. As we have shown, the
principal harm to Cl from A's representation of C2 is the danger that A
will share with C2 confidences or secrets of C1. Thus, one can imagine a
rule that simply prohibits (or allows) A from disclosing to C2 confidential
information obtained in the C1 representation. A rule restricted to
confidences, however, has several problems in the real world setting. First,
in concurrent representation situations the danger of conflicting
representation is not limited to the chance that A will share Cl's
confidences with C2, but includes the possibility that A will reduce the
vigor of his representation of C1 because of his conflicting loyalties to C2
(C2 faces the same danger as regards A's loyalty to Cl). A rule restricted to
confidences and secrets would not cope with this vigor of representation
problem. A second problem with a rule restricted to the disclosure of
confidential information is that, as a practical matter, A can use Cl's
confidences or secrets to Cl's disadvantage even if A tells C2 nothing about
Cl. For example, A might adopt a litigation strategy in the C2 representa-
tion based on A's knowledge of Cl's confidences, without informing C2 of
the substance of those confidences. One might imagine a rule requiring A
to act as if A had no confidences or secrets from the C1 representation,
but such a rule would impose an unrealistic, and probably impossible,
burden on A to act as if he does not know something that, in fact, he does.
A third problem with a rule restricted to A's disclosure of information is
that it would be extremely difficult to enforce, because C1 would not be
privy to A's conversations with C2. In many cases A will have the ability to
inform C2 of Cl's confidences and secrets without Cl ever discovering the
disclosure.
Given these problems with a rule restricted to information disclosure
by A, the parties might consider, in addition to an explicit rule on
information disclosure, a broader rule that would bar (or, in the
alternative, allow) A from representing C2. If A is prohibited from any
representation of C2, then A will not display reduced vigor in the C1
representation as a result of conflicting loyalties to C2; A will not have the
opportunity to use information gained in the C1 representation to the
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disadvantage of Cl in a subsequent representation; and A will have less of
an incentive to reveal Cl's confidences to third parties.
These two types of rules--disclosure rules and representation
rules-can exist separately. For example, one can imagine that, in some
cases, A would be barred from disclosing Cl's confidences or secrets to C2,
but that A would not be barred from representing C2 as long as he does
not reveal confidences. A variety of other permutations are possible. For
the most part, however, it turns out that the analyses of disclosure and
representation rules are quite similar. We will, therefore, consider
disclosure and representation rules together, although on occasion we will
distinguish them.
A. Giving A the Property Right
First, consider a regime of default rules that gives A the property
right, either as regards disclosure or as regards conflicting representation.
In this world, A could represent other parties, C2, C3, and so forth, with
interests that conflict with Cl's interests, and A could tell these other
parties any of Cl's secrets and confidences. C1 would not be able to bar A
from doing these things and could not obtain damages from A if A did so.
This might seem like an extremely bad set of default rules, but it is
useful to note that in the absence of transactions costs, these rules could
yield an efficient result. Take the following stylized cases in which A repre-
sents C2 and discloses Cl's secrets: in Case 1, A gets $10 profit and C1
loses $15; in Case 2, A gets $10 profit and C1 loses $2:




In the absence of transactions costs, C1 would not stand idly by while A
represented C2. Instead, C1 would offer to pay A not to represent C2. In
Case 1, C1 would offer some amount between $10 and $15, which A would
accept because A obtains only $10 in profit from the C2 representation; in
Case 2, Cl would offer no more than $2, which A would reject. The result
is that A would represent C2 in Case 2 and would not represent C2 in Case
1. These are the socially optimal results, because social wealth is increased
by the conflicting representation in Case 2 but decreased by that same rep-
resentation in Case 1.
In the real world, however, these bargained results would not be
achieved with any reliability. Part of the problem are the transaction costs
of bargaining; C1 often will not know about the A-C2 representation and,
therefore, may not be able to prevent it through bargaining. Even if C1
knows about the possible conflicting representation, C1 and A may fail to
reach agreement in Case 2, even though social welfare would be enhanced
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by a Cl-A agreement, because of strategic bargaining tactics by one or both
parties in the presence of a high degree of uncertainty as to the values C1
and A place on the C2 representation. Moreover, C1 and A may mistakenly
reach agreement in Case 1, even though social wealth would be enhanced
if they did not reach agreement. For example, if C1 places an erroneously
low estimate on the cost of the C2 representation, or A places an errone-
ously high estimate on the value of the representation, the parties may
mistakenly agree that the representation not go forward even though the
representation would increase net social wealth.
Aside from these bargaining problems, there is another difficulty with
giving A property right in C's confidences. If A has the property right, A
can threaten to engage in conflicting representation with C2 or to disclose
Cl's confidences without actually intending to carry out the threat. In fact,
A might actually seek out conflicting representations in order to make such
threats credible. Alternately, A could threaten to tell C's secrets to C2, or
to any other party who is in a position to use the information to the
detriment of C1.
Moreover, if A were given the property right, C1 would know that she
faced the probability that A would threaten conflicting representation or
disclosure. Knowing that she is likely to face high costs in the future if A
represents conflicting clients or discloses her confidences, C1 would lower
the amount she was willing to pay A in the first place. A "lemons" problem
could then arise because as the fee C1 would pay goes down, the fee will
tend to drive out of the market all attorneys except those who will seek to
supplement their income by threatening to represent conflicting clients or
disclose confidential information. 27 If C1 is sophisticated, she will know
that, as a result of the lemons problem, any attorney willing to take the
amount she offers is likely to be one who will behave opportunistically,
which will result in Cl's lowering still further the price she would be
willing pay.
A related problem concerns the sorts of information C1 is likely to
share with A. If C1 knows that any information she provides to A is likely to
find its way into hostile hands, C1 will greatly curtail the scope and amount
of information she provides to A even if the representation goes forward.
But this would almost certainly seriously impair the process of legal advice,
counsel, and compliance because if C1 does not provide A with full
information about her situation, C1 might not receive fully informed
advice from A about how to comply with the law or how to protect her
27. On lemons problems, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. Econ. 488 (1970). A lemons problem occurs
when a particular attribute of quality is not observable by a buyer. This forces the buyer to
rely on a proxy to measure the desired quality. Because the proxy is inexact, sellers may in-
crease their profits by substituting lower quality goods. Buyers, however, know that sellers are
likely to make such substitutions and accordingly reduce the amount they are willing to pay.
Because buyers pay less, suppliers of higher quality goods are driven out of the market and
only inferior goods remain.
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legal interests. 8
In short, it appears evident that giving A the property right, either to
represent C2 or to disclose information to C2 or some other person who
can use the information to Cl's disadvantage, is not a rule to which the
parties would routinely agree ex ante, and, accordingly, not a wise default
rule for the legal system to supply in the absence of explicit agreement by
the parties.
B. Giving C1 the Liability Right
An alternative regime of default rules would allow A to engage in the
subsequent representation of C2 or to disclose confidences or secrets of C1
to C2 or other parties, subject to a requirement that A pay C1 damages for
any harm that such representation or disclosure might cause to C1.2
Under such a liability regime, C1 would not have the power to veto A's
subsequent representation or disclosure. No court, for example, would
disqualify A for representing a conflicting interest in litigation with C1.
However, A would have to pay C1 damages for the harm, if any, caused by
the representation or disclosure.
Once again, it should be noted that this rule achieves the socially
optimal result in the absence of transactions costs. Let us return to the
example given above in subsection A:




In Case 2, A would realize that if he represented C2, he would have to pay
C1 damages of $2. A would go ahead with the representation anyway;
however, A will still make a net profit of $8 after paying Cl's damages. This
is the socially efficient result. In Case 1, A would realize that he would have
to pay C1 damages of $15, which would not be profitable because A makes
only $10. A would not agree to represent C2, which again is the socially
optimal result.
Things are not as simple in the real world of transactions costs,
however. Determining the proper amount of damages is one obvious
28. This observation is similar to the point made by Ronald Allen, Mark Grady, Daniel
Polsby, and Michael Yashko, who argued that the lav protects attorney-client confidences
against disclosure in court, even though the cost of doing so is that less information is made
available to the legal system, because doing so encourages clients to divulge to their attorneys
unfavorable information on which valid legal claims may depend. See Ronald J. Allen et al., A
Positive Theosy of the Attorney-Client Pivilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. Legal Stud. 359,
361 (1990).
29. The analysis in this section profited greatly from discussions with Louis Kaplow,
Professor of Law, Harvard University.
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difficulty with a liability rule which permits A to proceed with a conflicting
representation. Furthermore, when would the court determine damag-
es-at the outset of the C2 representation, or at the conclusion? If
damages are determined at the outset of the C2 representation, many
elements of harm may not be recognized by the court because the harm
will not yet have occurred. Also, other elements of damages may be
recognized even though in fact A and C2 would not actually impose these
costs on Cl. Thus, there is a great deal of error built into the determina-
tion of damages at the outset of the C2 representation. Moreover, deter-
mining damages at the outset creates a danger of opportunism by A and
C2% if damages are determined at the beginning of the C2 representation,
A and C2 would subsequently have an incentive to impose even greater
harm on C1 because, at that point, they would face no liability for doing
SO.
If Cl's damages are determined at the end of the C2 representation,
the problem of overestimating or underestimating damages can be
mitigated, because at the end of the process the court will be able to
investigate the actual harms C1 has suffered. Assessing damages after the
fact also avoids the problem of opportunism by A and C2, because they no
longer have an incentive to increase the harm to C1 from the subsequent
representation, and they will have to account for all the harm they cause
once the C2 representation terminates. On the other hand, waiting until
the end of the C2 representation is also subject to difficulties. The parties
probably would prefer to know sooner rather than later the extent of their
potential liability. There could also be serious difficulties determining
consequential damages in an ex post assessment. If C1 loses a case against
C2, in which A represents C2, C1 will argue that the loss was due to the
conflicting representation and that, if the A-C2 representation had not
occurred, C1 would have won the case. Should A be required to pay the
full amount of Cl's losses from the case? How can these losses be
determined, given that damages as well as liability may be in issue?
Even more troubling is the problem a court would face in
determining the facts of the matter. If C1 had the burden of proof on
damages, C1 would have to find out, for example, whether or not A
disclosed his confidences or secrets to C2, what materials and memoranda
A may have prepared during the course of representing C2, and what A
and C2 discussed about litigation strategy in the subsequent case. But these
are matters that fall in the heart of the traditional attorney-client and work
product privileges. Opening these matters for disclosure in Cl's suit for
damages against A could impose additional costs on Cl; they would also
affect the initial A-Cl representation because C1 might reduce the amount
and quality of information she tells A if she fears disclosure of this in-
formation in a subsequent lawsuit.
The trier of fact can commit any of three types of error in assessing
Cl's damages: it can (i) systematically underestimate damages, (ii) sys-
tematically overestimate damages, or (iii) make repeated but unbiased
errors across cases. In the first case (the trier of fact systematically
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underestimates damages)"0 we expect that A will engage in a higher level
of conflicting representation, and disclose more confidences and secrets of
C1, than would be socially optimal. However, the parties might attempt to
bargain around this result. For example, if A and C1 both understand that
the level of damages caused by A's conflicting representation or disclosure
of Cl's confidences and secrets will be set too low in court, C1 would then
have an incentive to pay A not to take on the C2 representation by an
amount equal to the difference between what C1 expects to receive in
judicially awarded damages and the actual losses C1 expects to incur. This
bargaining strategy would bring the liability rule closer to the rule dis-
cussed previously in which A has the property right, with the difference
being that the bargaining range in this second situation is smaller. This
strategy also has many of the same shortcomings as the property rule: A,
knowing that the liability rule would not fully compensate C1, could
threaten C1 with subsequent representations or disclosures and could seek
to be paid for not carrying out the threat. This would not be a situation to
which the parties (A and CQ) would want to agree ex ante.
Suppose that the court systematically over estimated Cl's damages,
rather than underestimating them. Here, we can clarify the analysis by
considering the following hypothetical:
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
A $10 $10 $10
Cl $(2) $(2) $(15)
Joint Product $8 $8 $(5)
Damages $(4) $(11) $(20)
One can see that in Case 3, A would not undertake the representation, and
that there is no amount that A could pay C1 that would make it worthwhile
for Cl to release any claims against A. This is the socially desirable result
because the joint product of the subsequent representation is negative. In
Case 1, A would proceed with the representation even without bargaining
with C1 because, even though the court overestimates Cl's damages, it is
still in A's interest to proceed with the representation and pay the
increased damages (A is still better off by $6). In Case 2, in the absence of
bargaining A would not proceed with the C2 representation, even though
it would be socially desirable that A do so; A would have to pay $11 in
damages, which exceeds A's profit of $10 from the C2 representation. If
bargaining is allowed, however, A could offer C1 an amount between $2
and $10 for a release of Cl's claim against A in connection with the C2
30. Ajudge or jury might systematically underestimate damages if, for example, the rules
of the jurisdiction exclude forms of consequential damages that could not be proven with a
high degree of confidence or if the jurisdiction limited Cl's ability to recover damages for
nonpecuniary losses that might flow from A's disclosures of Cl's confidences.
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representation, an offer which would be in Cl's interest to accept. If the
bargain were struck, the C2 representation would go forward, which is the
socially efficient result. However, this result would only be possible through
bargaining ex ante; once the court has awarded the damages of $11, C1
will not accept anything less than $11 to release the claim.
But in bargaining ex ante, the parties may not have good information
about the amount of overage the court will award. This factor may prevent
the efficient bargain from being struck if optimism by one or both parties
eliminates the bargaining range. Further, bargaining itself is expensive and
may fail for other reasons, such as strategic posturing by the parties. We
may therefore conclude that a liability rule is not a particularly effective
default term for cases in which the courts systematically overestimate CU's
damages.
Finally, consider the situation in which the court makes frequent, but
randomly distributed, errors as to damages. That is, on average, damages
come out about right, even though there are wide variations in individual
cases. Here, if the parties know, on a case-by-case basis, whether the error
is likely to favor A or C1, the analysis is essentially the same as the analysis
presented immediately above with respect to systematic judicial over or
under estimation of Cl's damages. But if the parties cannot predict whet-
her the court will rule in favor of A or C1, the problems we identified with
opportunism (in the case of systematic underestimation of damages) or of
high transaction costs of bargaining in the shadow of litigation (in the case
of systematic overestimation of damages) are not strongly present. The un-
predictability of outcome, if small, will impose some costs on the parties if
they are risk averse, but these costs are not likely to be great. If the
unpredictability is large, however, the parties will suffer significant
litigation costs in many cases, because optimism by either or both parties
may prevent them from settling their cases. However, the social costs of a
liability rule when judicial error is unbiased do appear to be less than the
costs of such a rule when there is systematic bias either for A or for C1.
One other factor should be considered here as well. Thus far, we have
been assuming a liability rule that exactly compensates C1 for her harm.
Such a rule may not be optimal, however, even if a liability rule regime is
chosen, for two reasons. First, because of monitoring difficulties noted
already, there will be many cases in which A represents C2 or discloses Cl's
confidences, but C1 does not find out about the violation and accordingly
never seeks redress. Because A will know that there is a probability that he
will not get caught, A may choose to represent C2 even in situations when
he would not represent C2 if he had to pay damages, because the cost of
damages to A must be discounted by the probability of enforcement. This
problem could be mitigated by setting the damages A had to pay at a level
somewhat above the level of Cl's actual damages-although if the increase
is set too high, we introduce dangers of opportunism by C1 and of over-
deterrence.
A second problem with setting the damages just at the level necessary
to compensate C1 for harm is that, effectively, we are allocating the entire
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joint product of the representation to A. 3 ' There is no obvious social
policy reason why this should be so. One way to look at the C2
representation is to imagine that A is acting as a wholesaler of a valuable
good (information) produced by C1. A resells this information to C2when
undertaking the subsequent representation. A rule restricting Cl's recovery
to compensatory damages essentially deprives C1 of any of the profit from
the resale of the information. This rule may be undesirable because it re-
duces Cl's incentive to create the information in the first place.
On the other hand, under a liability regime, A would presumably
compensate C1 ex ante in the form of a lower fee for some of A's profits
on subsequent resale of Cl's confidences. This could give C1 the
appropriate incentive to develop information, provided that A can monitor
Cl's behavior and insist that C1 actually develop the information ex post
(otherwise C1 could take the money and opportunistically refuse to
develop the information). Moreover, there may be some benefit to C1 in
giving A the entire surplus from resale, because doing so gives A the
incentive to actively seek out a "buyer." If the deal is one where C1 actually
wants the confidences to be sold, in hopes of getting compensated for
them in an amount that exceeds the costs to C1 of disclosure, then C1
might want A to have the proper incentives to act as a good agent in
arranging a sale.
This analysis suggests that in cases where C1 is actually looking to A to
seek out a buyer in the form of C2, the recovery under a liability rule
should be limited to compensatory damages in order to give A the right
incentives to perform the brokerage or wholesaling function effectively. In
other cases, however, where C1 does not wish ex ante that her confidences
or secrets come out, the appropriate measure of damages might be set at
an amount somewhat higher than compensatory damages, either by way of
added recovery for C1, or by way of a fine or other sanction, the benefits
of which accrue to the state. It is likely to be very difficult, however, to
distinguish as a practical matter between cases where C1 does and does not
wish to sell her confidences; and, if the difficulties of drawing this dis-
tinction are great enough, it makes sense for the default rule to be one of
compensatory damages coupled with an added state-imposed sanction,
which avoids the inventive problems that would be caused by giving the
added recovery to C1.
As the above discussion illustrates, the analysis of the pros and cons of
a liability rule for attorney conflicts of interest is by no means simple. The
major considerations, however, appear to be the following. First, damages
are likely to be extremely difficult to quantify. This difficulty might result
in fairly high transaction costs, including increased litigation costs,
31. We have assumed in this paper that A captures all the rents associated with the C2
representation; in actuality, A would share these rents with C2, so that the effect of a liability
rule in which C1 was entitled only to compensatory damages would be to allocate part of the
joint product of the subsequent representation to C2.
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increased negotiation costs, and the enhanced likelihood of litigation due
to the size of the parties' settlement demands. Second, determining
damages in a judicial proceeding is likely to involve the court in an
examination of work product and attorney-client information, which is
probably undesirable for the parties ex ante. If courts systematically
underestimate Cl's damages, the result will be a partial return to a
property rule in which A has the right; the difficulties of opportunism by
A, which we noted in the previous section of this article, return to the
analysis. If courts systematically overestimate Cl's damages, the result is a
partial property rule in which C1 has the property right; this remits the
parties to a process of bargaining in the shadow of the law. Where judicial
error is unbiased, these problems of opportunism and transaction costs are
mitigated, but there remain the problems of risk-aversion by the parties
and of how to set the level of damages given a positive probability that C1
will not enforce her property right against A. These difficulties suggest that
there are significant problems with aliability rule on attorney conflicts of
interest. However, we cannot confidently rule out the liability rule as a
default term in the attorney-client relationship until we have examined the
alternative of a property rule in which C1 has the property right.
C. Giving Cl the Property Right
One might suppose that the most efficient solution would be simply
to bar the attorney from representing C2 or from disclosing Cl's
confidences, subject to renegotiation ex post between A and C1. This is the
equivalent of giving C1 a property right in the matter. Would this property
rule work better than a liability rule as a default term of the attorney-client
relationship?
As with the other rules discussed in this article, vesting the property
right in C1 would, in the absence of transaction costs, achieve the socially
efficient outcome. Return to the simple hypothetical already discussed:
Case 1 Case 2
A $10 $10
Cl ($15) ($2)
Joint Product ($5) $8
in both Case 1 and Case 2, in the absence of some form of compensation,
C1 would refuse A's request for permission to engage in the C2 rep-
resentations, because both representations impose a cost on C1. In Case 2,
however, A could offer C1 some amount between $2 and $10 to allow A to
go forward, which C1 would accept because it would make her better off
than if the representation did not go forward. In Case 1, there is no
economically efficient bargaining range where A could persuade C1 to
agree to the C2 representation. A would represent C2 in Case 2 but not in
Case 1-the socially efficient result.
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In the world of transaction costs, what are the pros and cons of giving
the property right to Cl? Vesting the property right in C1 is clearly
superior to the alternative property rule regime in which the right is given
to A. The problems of opportunism by A and degeneration of the market
for legal services due to the creation of a market for "lemons" are not
present when the property right is vested in C1 rather than A. A cannot
credibly threaten C1 with conflicting representations because CI has the
absolute legal power to veto such representations. Similarly, A cannot
effectively blackmail C1 by threatening to reveal Cl's confidences or secrets
if the law prohibits such disclosure and it is enforced.
A more complex analysis is required when we compare property and
liability regimes in which C1 is given the legal right. Among the most
significant advantages of a property rule is that C1 would not have to reveal
any attorney-client information. C1 has the right to veto the A-C2
representation and can refuse to grant permission to A to disclose any
attorney-client information, without providing any reason or excuse.
Because information developed in the A-Cl relationship would not have to
be judicially investigated and quantified under the property rule regime,
this potential difficulty is avoided.
Another potential advantage of a property rule is that, in some
situations, it can reduce the transaction costs incident to A and Cl
reaching efficient bargains about subsequent representations. In the case
of a liability rule, the court may be called on to determine the amount of
Cl's damages. But, as we have seen, there are significant difficulties in
judicially quantifying the harm to C1. In the case of a property regime, on
the other hand, C1 will have the sole power to determine the extent of
compensation C1 wants for giving A the right to represent C2. The trans-
action costs for C1 to determine how much she will demand in bargaining
with A would appear to be considerably lower than the transaction costs
for C1 and A to reach a judicial determination of damages.
A property rule has an additional advantage in that it does not
require the parties to settle ex ante on the basis of highly contingent
future events. We have seen that in a liability regime A would effectively
compensate C1 ex ante for the right to engage in profitable conflicting
representation and to pay C1 damages for any resultant harm. The
consideration received by C1 would be in the form of a lower hourly fee or
other compensation that A would agree to pay for the right to engage in a
subsequent conflicting representation. This amount, however, would be
extremely difficult for the parties to quantify, and thus A may end up
overcompensating or undercompensating C1 for the right to engage in
future conflicts. This uncertainty is considerably minimized under a
property rule because, in such a regime, A would pay nothing to C1 ex
ante and, therefore, would not have to guess at the value of the right to
represent as-yet unknown C2s. In a property regime, A would pay C1 only
at the time an actual C2 representation became possible; and, in this
setting, it will be easier (although still very difficult) for the parties to
evaluate their respective costs and benefits from the subsequent
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representation.
On the other hand, this residual difficulty in evaluating cost and
benefits means that the transaction costs under a property regime would
not be trivial. It is obviously misleading to compare litigation in a liability
regime to the bargaining in a property regime. The overwhelming majority
of cases in a liability rule regime would also be resolved through
bargaining: either A would seek to strike an advance deal with C1 by
paying for the right to represent C2 or the parties would agree to a
settlement during the course of litigation. Thus, while litigation is perhaps
more likely to occur under a liability regime than a property regime, it will
be most common under either system for the parties to resolve their
differences by bargaining.
3 2
Moreover, as compared with a property rule, a liability rule may be
less problematic because it facilitates bargaining. The liability rule "anchors"
the bargaining process at the point of Cl's damages (assuming this is
chosen as the appropriate point at which to measure liability). This anchor
may centralize bargaining and thus reduce the likelihood that strategic
considerations will prevent A and Cl from striking a mutually beneficial
deal.
A property rule may also be problematic because it presents the
appearance but not the reality of over compensating Cl for the value
created in the A-C2 representation. Take the case in which the subsequent
representation will earn A $10 and cost C1 only $3. The bargaining range
here is between $3 and $10, and Cl could, in theory, hold out for the full
$10 under a property regime. Intuitively it would be opportunistic for C1
to hold out for the full $10, whereas it would not be opportunistic for A to
hold out for the minimum payment of $3 necessary to make Cl whole. The
reason for this intuition is that the client in this situation, who is not in the
business of making money from legal representation, would prefer a
hedged position with respect to future representation to one involving the
risk of undervaluing the harm caused by the A-C2 representation. The
client can hedge against risk through a damage award whereas the lawyer,
by taking on additional risk, has an increased incentive to seek out new
work-an incentive the benefit of which can be partially remitted to C1 in
the form of ex ante compensation at the time of the original contract.
Under this analysis, it might be in the parties' interest ex ante to agree to
a term under which C1 receives only compensation for any harm as a
result of the subsequent representation-in effect, a liability rule rather
than a property rule.
Furthermore, we have seen that, under a liability regime, the parties
32. This does not, however, appear to be a situation where effectively dividing the
property right between A and Cl will facilitate efficient trading between them, given the
extreme difficulties in reaching an independent valuation in court. For discussion of cases
where liability rules might facilitate efficient trading, see generally Ayres & Talley, Solomonic
Bargaining, supra note 26 (discussing ways in which dividing the entitlement can mitigate
strategic incentives to misrepresent private valuations).
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might choose to delay settlement until the conclusion of the A-C2
representation in order to reduce the element of speculation in the
damages calculation and to minimize the danger that A will behave oppor-
tunistically towards C1 after obtaining a release from C1 early in the C2
representation. In the case of a property rule, however, the parties would
almost certainly want to resolve the matter at the outset of the A-C2
representation, but for somewhat different reasons. C1 would prefer that
the matter be addressed before A begins to represent C2 because, once the
representation starts, A is likely to disclose Cl's information. Once the
representation begins, Cl's legal right to bar A from the C2 representation
would not be particularly valuable, because C2 knows the crucial
information and can always obtain another lawyer. A would prefer that the
matter be addressed early, because A will be expending sunk costs in the
C2 representation and thus placing himself at greater and greater risk that
C1 will take bargaining advantage of him by threatening him with
forfeiture of these sunk costs.
These considerations suggest that, in general, A and C1 would prefer
to resolve the question of the C2 representation early under a property
rule. However, we have also seen that early resolution poses difficulties for
the parties. When the parties settle early, they do so in the presence of a
high degree of uncertainty about the future, and this may represent a cost
to risk-averse parties and impair the bargaining process by creating the
potential for bargaining breakdown due to unwarranted optimism by one
or both parties. Moreover, early settlement creates the danger that A will
behave opportunistically towards C1 after obtaining Cl's permission to the
C2 representation. C1 will have very little ability to monitor A's behavior
once permission is granted because A will be representing a party with
interests hostile to those of C1. The need to resolve the representation
question early in the property rule regime appears to be a factor that
might favor the liability rule over the property rule.
Another problem with a property rule is due to sunk costs by A in the
event the parties fall to resolve the representation question at the outset of
the A-C2 representation. In some cases, A will invest significant resources in
the C2 representation before realizing that there is a conflict with C1.
Assume, for example, that A engages in search costs of $5 in connection
with a proposed representation before identifying a potential conflict of
interest with C1. The subsequent representation is worth $10 to A, and it
will impose a cost of $3 on C1. At this point, C1 can demand compensation
up to $10 for giving permission for the representation, because A's $5
search costs are sunk and cannot be recovered. Payment of an amount
over $5 by A would make the representation a losing proposition for A. In
itself, this does not indicate that the transaction will be inefficient from a
social point of view, as it represents a mere wealth transfer from A to C1.
However, if attorneys know ex ante that they will incur unrecoverable
search costs and thus they will face the prospect of losing money as a result
of the need to obtain permission from the first client, they will either
impose these costs on clients at the time of the original contract in the
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form of a risk premium-with all the uncertainties incident to calculating
such a premium ex ante-or they will reduce their willingness to engage in
costly searches for new business. Either of these strategies may be socially
inefficient. Note, moreover, that it is not only A who engages in search
costs incident to the subsequent representation; C2 must do so as well, and
these costs too will be forfeited if A does not obtain permission from C1 to
engage in the representation.
Another factor worth considering is the incentive effects that a
property rule would have on A's willingness to identify a "buyer" of Cl's
information, in cases where C1 would potentially benefit from the
subsequent A-C2 representation. A liability rule with compensatory dam-
ages provides A with a strong incentive to seek out higher value users of
the' information, because A will be able to keep all of the surplus from a
"sale" of the information which he does not share with C2. A property rule,
on the other hand, offers somewhat lower incentives to A to seek out
higher value users of the information, because A will have to share a
substantial amount of the surplus with C1 as the price for obtaining Cl's
consent to the subsequent representation. If A and C1 will often have an
affirmative interest in creating a joint product through a subsequent
conflicting representation, this factor might weigh in favor of a liability
rule rather than a property rule. However, even if C1 is willing, all other
things being equal, to sell her proprietary information to a third party, C1
may not necessarily want A to be the broker (or wholesaler, depending on
how A's role is characterized). The relationship between C1 and A is
presumably entered into because of Cl's confidence in A's legal skills, not
A's skills at hawking Cl's confidences to third parties. If C1 can more
efficiently market the confidential information directly, or by means of a
broker other than A, then considerations of motivating A to act as a
diligent agent in marketing Cl's information become attenuated.
Finally, problems of enforcement might be somewhat greater under a
property rule than under a liability rule. Under a liability regime, even if A
has to pay damages to C1, he can often make a profit from the C2
representation. Under a property regime, A may reasonably fear that C1
will appropriate more, or even all, of the surplus from the C2 representa-
tion. Rather than allow this to happen, A may elect not to inform C1 of the
C2 representation, or, may even disguise his involvement with C2 in order
to keep this information from C1. Because A is likely to be less compliant
under a property regime, C1 is likely to have more difficulty enforcing her
rights.
The foregoing comparisons of the rule giving C1 the property right
with the other alternatives (giving the property right to A or giving the
liability right to Cl) indicate that the analysis is surprisingly complex and
somewhat indeterminate. Our view is that, all things considered, a property
rule favoring C1 is superior to the others. Giving the property right to A
can be ruled out because of the severe opportunism problems it presents.
The relevant factors also appear to support a property rule in C1 over a lia-
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bility rule for Cl. Because courts do not ordinarily get involved in
determining damages under a property regime, the transaction costs of the
property rule are likely to be lower than under a liability rule, notwith-
standing the several ways in which the liability rule may conserve on
transaction costs relative to a property rule. Very significant is the fact that
the property rule does not open up the A-Cl relationship to judicial scruti-
ny-thus protecting values inherent in the protections for attorney-client
confidences and secrets. Other factors considered in the above
analysis-such as devising a compensation scheme that motivates A to seek
out the highest valued user of Cl's confidential information-will probably
not play an important role in most cases of conflicting representation;
when such factors do play a role, the parties can always bargain around the
default rule to account for their particular needs and circumstances.
III. SOME MODIFICATIONS
So far, we have concluded that, in general, the best default rule for
attorney conflicts of interest is one that gives C1 the right to bar
subsequent conflicting representation, subject to ex post renegotiation
between attorney and client. In this section, we explore several
modifications of this basic rule that might improve its operation as a
default rule. It turns out that the existing rules on conflicts of interest, for
the most part, operate in a way consistent with the economic analysis.
A. Threshold Exception
One problem with a contractual clause that gives C1 a right to bar
subsequent representation of conflicting interests by A is that it will be
costly for A to contract and negotiate with C1 for permission and costly for
C1 to consider the matter. In cases where the costs to C1 from the
subsequent representation can be assumed to be negligible, it may be more
efficient to allow A to proceed with the representation, even though doing
so may impose a slight cost on C1. For example, if it costs A $1 to seek
permission from C1 for a representation that will cost C1 only $.50, then it
would be socially inefficient to require A to seek Cl's permission. Neither
A nor C1 would prefer a rule ex ante that required consultation and
consent in this situation, given that such a rule reduces the joint product
of the parties. This analysis suggests that the general rule ought to be
qualified by a term that allows A to proceed with representation of C2 in
cases where the harm to C1 from the representation is likely to be slight.
While the parties would probably agree, ex ante, to allow A to
proceed with representation when the harm to C1 is slight, this rule would
create potential problems as it would be up to A to determine whether or
not the harm to C1 is in fact "slight." A may not have full information
about Cl's affairs and so may decide in good faith that C1 would only be
slightly hanned by the C2 representation, when in fact C1 might be
significantly harmed by the representation. In addition, A will not always
act in good faith. If A wants to represent C2 without having to seek Cl's
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permission (and, potentially, having to pay C1 for the right to engage in
the subsequent representation), A may decide to proceed as if the harm to
C1 is slight, even though A knows that it is not slight.
These problems will tend to arise only in marginal cases. In many
cases, it will be perfectly clear that either the harm to C1 from the C2
representation is, in fact, slight, or that the harm to Cl is substantial. When
A represents C2, even though A knows or reasonably should know that the
harm to C1 is substantial, A should not be able to take advantage of a
threshold exception to the property rule; by the same token, where it is
clear that the harm to C1 is indeed slight, C1 should not be able to
interpose an objection to the A-C2 representation. In close cases, however,
the uncertainty as to when the threshold rule should come into play can
pose problems. There is no easy solution to these difficulties. 3 However,
that there may be difficulties in close cases does not in itself rule out a
threshold rule allowing A to proceed with the C2 representation when the
harm to C1 is slight.
A more difficult question is whether there should also be a threshold
exception to disclosure. One can imagine a default rule that permits A to
proceed with the C2 representation when the harm to C1 is slight, but that
nevertheless bars A from disclosing Cl's confidences or secrets during the
course of this representation, even when A believes that the harm to Cl
from disclosure would also be slight. There could be several reasons for
this distinction. First, because A will often lack information about the
importance to C1 of information A has obtained in the C1 representation,
A may often be in error as to whether or not the harm to C1 of divulging
the information is slight. Because A will tend to shade his judgment in
favor of the conclusion that the harm to C1 is in fact slight, it may be
better simply to bar any disclosure of attorney-client information in the
absence of Cl's consent. Additionally, the A-C2 representation reflects the
input of A's labor and experience plus the value added by the prior repre-
sentation of C1. In contrast, if A discloses a confidence or secret of C1, the
only value from the disclosure is the value that C1 has created in
generating the information. Thus, there would appear to be less social
harm in preventing A from divulging Cl's confidences or secrets in
situations where C1 has not consented than in preventing A from working
on the matter altogether.
Another value of an absolute rule against disclosure, coupled with a
threshold rule on representation, is that disclosure is potentially more
dangerous and harder to prevent. Disclosure can happen very quickly, and
once a secret is out, it cannot be taken back. Representation, on the other
hand, occurs over time and, if the representation is inappropriate, can be
33. One approach might be to require A to inform C1 of the C2 representation in all
close cases, without giving C1 the power to veto the representation; Cl would then have the
burden of convincing A that the harm to C1 is more than slight or of seekingjudicial relief if
A continues with the representation.
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stopped. Thus, a more stringent rule on disclosure, as compared with the
rule on representation, may be warranted.
Finally, recall that if A fully complies with a rule banning disclosure,
there will be little harm to C1 from the C2 representation (except in
concurrent representation situations where the vigor of representation may
be an issue). As we have seen, however, it will be difficult to police the rule
prohibiting disclosure if A represents C2, and, when the harm to C1 from
the C2 representation is likely to be substantial; thus, a prophylactic rule
on representation is warranted. When the harm to C1 from the C2
representation is not likely to be substantial, however, it may not be
necessary to bar subsequent representation provided that the attorney
continues to operate under an obligation not to reveal Cl's confidences
and secrets without permission. We may assume that due to monitoring
and enforcement problems, A will often disclose Cl's confidences or use
Cl's confidences to her disadvantage in the C2 representation. If the harm
from the C2 representation is only slight, however, the danger that A will
disobey the injunction against disclosure may be sufficiently low as to
remove the need for a prophylactic rule on representation in this setting.
In conclusion, the analysis is again not straightforward and is subject
to competing inferences. It appears most reasonable that there should be a
threshold exception to the property rule on representation-A should be
allowed to represent C2 without Cl's permission when the harm to Cl
from the C2 representation is slight. However, a property rule should apply
across the board on the question of disclosure, so that A cannot disclose
Cl's confidences or secrets to C2 without Cl's consent, even when the
harm to C1 from the disclosure is only slight.
B. Rules to Combat Opportunism
Another modification to the rule prohibiting A from representing C2
without Cl's consent might take account of the danger of opportunism. As
previously noted, there are two dangers here. First, consider a case in
which A will get a rent of $10 from the C2 representation, C1 will incur a
loss of $3, and A has already spent $5 in investigation costs. C1 could hold
out for the full $10 of A's rent before allowing A to proceed,-" but this
would be inefficient because A would incur a loss of $5; ex ante, knowing
of the potential loss, A would demand to be compensated by Cl for the
risk of loss and would engage in an inefficient, low level of search for new
business. One could imagine a rule that would allow A to go forward with
the C2 representation when A has incurred significant sunk costs in
34. This case differs from the standard franchising problem in which one of the parties
to the franchise contract may be able opportunistically to expropriate the other's sunk costs
to the party's own advantage; here, CI is not seeking to expropriate the value of the sunk
costs but only threatening to cause A to forfeit it. See generally Gillian Hadfield, Problematic
Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 927 (1990) (discussing
problems of opportunism in the law of contracts).
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investigating the C2 matter, but this would be subject to the serious
drawback that it would give A an incentive to incur sunk costs in order to
strip C1 of her property right.
A less sweeping rule would allow A to go forward only if the harm to
C1 from the C2 representation is slight-the same rule that appears to be
advisable as a means for reducing transactions costs where the harm
involved is small. This rule appears well crafted to deal with the sunk cost
problem as well, because, in most cases in which A has expended
significant sunk costs on the C2 matter before discovering a conflict with
C1, the harm to C1 from the C2 representation is likely to be slight
(otherwise A likely would have identified the existence of a conflict
earlier)."' We conclude, therefore, that a threshold exception to a liability
rule can be of help in addressing the sunk cost problem as well.
The second case to consider is one where C1 has notice of A's
representation but sits on her rights until A has incurred significant sunk
costs and then interposes an objection to the C2 representation. Cl's delay
in this situation is quite clearly for opportunistic motives because, by
waiting until A has incurred large sunk costs, C1 can obtain greater bar-
gaining leverage in the negotiations over consent to the C2 representation.
There would be good reason for the parties to stipulate ex ante that Cl's
failure to act constitutes a waiver. Ex ante, both C1 and A would agree to
prohibit such behavior because it represents a negative joint product, or at
least a lower than optimal joint product, that can easily be avoided if C1
does not sit on her rights.
C. Additional Sanction for Noncompliance
A third modification of the simple property rule would be for the law
to specify penalties for A's violation of the default rule, above and beyond
the availability of an order disqualifying A from continuing to represent
C2. There are at least two reasons why additional sanctions might be
advisable. First, if A has disclosed Cl's confidences or secrets to C2, a
judicial order of disqualification will do little to help C1 and may not deter
A because A may have already been paid for the information. Unless A
fears a sanction in addition to disqualification, A will have an incentive to
disclose Cl's confidences and secrets early in order to receive compensa-
tion before being required to leave the case. Second, as we have seen, rules
regulating A's representation or disclosure of information to C2 are hard
to enforce as C1 does not directly monitor A's conduct. The probability of
detection is not high, especially because A can disguise his participation in
a case by acting as a consultant whose name does not appear on court
papers or other documents. If A believes there is a substantial probability
35. This is not necessarily true, of course; as Stephen Gillers pointed out, attorneys are
sometimes sloppy, and even if they do due exercise diligence beforehand, they may not fully
understand the conflict rules or the harm against which they protect the former client.
Memorandum from Stephen Gillers, supra note 25, at 4.
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that he will be able to represent C2 or disclose Cl's information without
being detected, A will likely do so, notwithstanding the presence of rules
prohibiting such representation or disclosure, unless the state supplies an
additional sanction for A's misconduct.
These considerations suggest that in addition to disqualification, A
should fear an additional sanction. What form this sanction should take is
a different question. It could take the form of greater-than compensatory
money damages in cases where disqualification alone will not make C1
whole. The sanction could take the form of a fine or other penalty
imposed by the state, the benefits of which, if any, would not go to C1.
Perhaps even more effectively, the sanction could be in the form of
reputation loss (and thus the resultant loss of business) to an attorney who
engages in an inappropriate conflict of interest representation under the
existing rules.m If A and C1 had the ability to do so, they would probably
agree ex ante to the establishment of such an additional sanctioning re-
gime.
IV. THE MODEL RULES AND THE MODEL CODE
The analysis of the appropriate background rule so far suggests that,
in general, the attorney and client would ordinarily agree-subject to
reasonable terms designed to deal with threshold situations, client
opportunism, and sanctions for violations-that (i) A will not undertake a
conflicting representation without the consent of C1, and (ii) A will not
disclose or use adversely to C1 information obtained during the
representation. This represents the general pattern observed in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct3 7 and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility 8, both of which were drafted by the American Bar
Association, 9 which impose upon the attorney a strict duty of confidenti-
ality,4° and generally prohibit the representation of conflicting interests
without the consent of the client.4' It appears that in broad pattern the
Model Rules and the Model Code are quite consistent with reasonable
inferences about economic efficiency.
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36. We are grateful for personal conversations with Donald Langevoort, during which he
made this observation.
37. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983).
38. Modem Rules of Professional Conduct (1981).
39. For a discussion of the process of promulgating codes of legal ethics, see Recent
Development, Developments in the Law: Lanyers' Responsiilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 Harv.
L. Rev. 1547, 1581-82 (1994).
40. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1983); Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 4-101 (1981).
41. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.7-1.9 (1983); Model Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 5-105 (1981).
42. Confidentiality rules enjoy fairly widespread approbation among the commentators.
See Epstein, supra note 5, at 593 (praising the rules governing attorney-client conflicts of
interests). However, they have also been challenged as not being adequately justified and as
serving the interests of the organized bar more than that of the public. See Fred C. Zacharias,
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What about the conclusions reached in this paper, that the
background rule allowing Cl to prohibit A from conflicting representation
should apply only beyond a certain threshold of harm to C1 in order to
economize on transaction costs and to police against opportunistic
behavior by Cl? The ethics rules do not contain an explicit threshold
exception of this sort, but they can be interpreted according to a rule of
reason that permits representation to go forward without Cl's consent
when the harm to Cl is not substantial. Thus, if the differences between Cl
and C2 are not sufficiently concrete to rise to the level of a conflict, the
rules do not apply. Model Rule 1.7(a) provides, for example, that, in
general, "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client."43 If the representa-
tion is not directly adverse to Cl, but only slightly in tension, impliedy the
attorney can proceed without obtaining Cl's consent-even though there
is a possibility that the interest of Cl may be harmed by the second
representation." This is, in effect, a threshold exception to the rule
requiring Cl's permission to the representation, and it appears to be quite
Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 361-70 (1989) (questioning the strength of tradi-
tional justifications for confidentiality rules); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality 11: Is
Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 629 (1991) (describing the self-serving
nature of strict confidentiality provisions). Confidentiality rules can implicate third party
interests, such as the interest of other persons in being able to avoid or rectify a client's
criminal or fraudulent behavior, the Model Code and Model Rules contain limited
"whistleblower" exceptions to deal with these situations, which have been quite controversial.
See generally Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of
Optimal Whistleblowing Rules 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 21 (1995) (proposing a voluntary regime
that permits individual lawyers to decide which whistleblowing rules they will follow).
43. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(a) (1983). To like effect is the Model
Code, which provides in Disciplinary Rule 5-101 (a) that "[e]xcept with the consent of his
client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his
professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own
financial, business, property, or personal interests." Model Code of Professional Responsibility
DR 5-101(a) (1981). DR 5-105(A) provides that
[a] lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected
by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve
him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-
105(c).
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105(A) (1981). DR 5-105(C) provides that "a
lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible
effect of sdch representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on
behalf of each." Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105(C) (1981).
44. Not all ethics scholars would agree with the proposition that the Model Rules refer
implicitly to a continuum of harms and apply only when the quantum of harm reaches a
sufficiently high level. Stephen Gillers, for example, argued in comments to this paper that
the Rules adopt a categorical, rather than a quantitative, approach. See Memorandum from
Stephen Gillers, supra note 25, at 5-7. We believe this objection is largely semantic. Even if the
rules attempt to establish a categorical approach, their effect is going to be quantitative: when
the degree of conflict becomes severe enough, the rule applies; otherwise, it does not.
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a reasonable rule given the analysis of optimal default terms presented
above.
On the other hand, parallel to the default term which we have argued
is optimal, the Model Rules and the Model Code do not appear to contain
any threshold exception for disclosure (as opposed to representation). The
attorney is barred from disclosing confidences or secrets of his client (or
former client) even if the representation in which the attorney is engaged
does not rise to the level of a conflict. If A's disclosure of a client
confidence or secret is truly de minimis, it may be unlikely to constitute
grounds for formal disciplinary proceedings, but it is nevertheless a
violation of the disciplinary rules.
Similarly, the comments to the Model Code and the Model Rules also
distinguish rather sharply between litigation and negotiation settings.4
This distinction makes sense from the standpoint of default rule analysis.
In the negotiation setting, both clients are attempting to create value
through a process of bargaining which they hope will generate substantial
benefits for each of them.46 Their interests are aligned in that each wants
to increase the size of the overall pie, even though they also have a conflict
of interest in that each wants as big a share as 'possible of the wealth so
created.47 Because of the substantial alignment of interests in the negotia-
tion setting, the dangers of harm to C1 from the attorney who is also
representing C2, a party in negotiation with C1, may not be as great as
would be the case in a litigation setting in which the parties are fighting
over the division of a fixed (or shrinking) pie with little or no alignment of
interests. Thus, negotiations are more likely to fall below the consent
threshold than is litigation.
Another factor of importance in the negotiation setting is the role
assigned to the attorney. If A is functioning essentially as a scrivener,
recording in proper legal form an agreement being negotiated by the
parties on their own, there is little danger of harm to C1 from joint
representation. By contrast, if A was charged by one or both parties with
substantive authority for conducting the negotiation or with providing
business advice on the terms of the deal, the risk of harm to C1 increases.
To the degree that the lawyer's role becomes merely technical, there is a
reduced danger of harm to the clients from multiple representation and
45. Rule 1.7(a)(1) guards against this problem, to an extent, with the requirement that
the lawyer must reasonably believe that "the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client," Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(a)(1)
(1983), but this does not rule out cases in which the first client's interests could potentially be
harmed by the representation, so long as the lawyer reasonably believes that they will not be
harmed. See also Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt. 1 7 (1983) ("[C]ommon
representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is
minimal .... ").
46. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt. 1 11-14 (1983).
47. See Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lauyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing 94
Yale LJ. 239, 241 (1984).
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an increased likelihood that a given case will fall below the consent
threshold.
The rules on conflicts within law firms also appear to be generally
consistent with economic theory. With respect to concurrent conflicts, the
rule is one of absolute imputed disqualification: disqualification of any
attorney in a firm disqualifies the entire firm.48 This rule makes a great
deal of sense for a small law office, with four or five lawyers. It makes less
sense for a very large law firm, especially one with offices in different cities
or countries and sophisticated procedures in place for maintaining
confidentiality within the firm as well as between the firm and the outside
world. At some point, the damage to C1 from a firm representing C2 may
become attenuated when the firm is very large in size,49 the attorney who
is working for C2 is different from the attorney working for Cl, and proper
procedures for maintaining confidentiality of information in the two repre-
sentations are followed. However, it does not appear unreasonable to
maintain a rule of imputed disqualification even in large firm cases, given
the absence of efficiency losses and the difficulty of identifying situations
where the danger to C1 is sufficiently attenuated as to fall below the
relevant threshold. In this context, it is also relevant that, in the large,
multi-office law firm, the efficiency gains from allowing A's firm to
represent C2 are often nonexistent. Specifically, when the attorney working
on C2's matter is physically separated from the attorney in the firm who
worked on Cl's matter then any generic legal skills that the firm acquired
in representing C1 will not benefit C2. In particular, in the large, multi-
office law-firm context, there will be no cost savings to C2 from the fact
that another lawyer in the same firm previously represented C1. Because,
obviously, if the lawyers are in different offices and are not working
together, the human capital skills that were developed in one office are
not going to be transferred to the lawyers in the other office. One
implication of this is that as the damages to Cl from the subsequent repre-
sentation of C2 becomes more attenuated, so too do the gains to A from
such subsequent representations.
The ethics codes also adopt what appears to be a rather sensible
default rule in such situations. If A's representation of C1 has terminated,
and A subsequently considers a representation of C2, whose interests
conflict with Cl, there is clearly a danger that the second representation
will harm Cl's interests. Thus, some rule of disqualification should apply.
However, the dangers of conflict are considerably lower in this situation
than in the simultaneous representation context because the information A
48. See Model Rules Rule 1.10 ("While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so. . . ."); Model Code DR 5-105(D) ("If a lawyer is required to decline employ-
ment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such employment.").
49. On firm size, see Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The
Transformation of the Big Law Firm (1991).
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has about C1 is going to become quickly outdated. The rules capture this
effect fairly well by providing that "[a] lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another
person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless
the former client consents after consultation.""' The comments to the
rule make clear that the term "substantially related" refers to the specific
facts of the former representation, not to general similarities in fact or
law.5 '1 Although the rule is not explicitly tied to the fact that the quality of
information deteriorates over time, this is its practical effect, as, over time,
circumstances are likely to change sufficiently as to make the subsequent
representation not substantially related to the former representation.
When it comes to the movement of attorneys from firm to firm, the
rules regarding conflicting representations are sensibly less stringent than
the rule of absolute imputed disqualification that applies in the single-firm
context. As a. practical matter, if one attorney from a large firm carried all
the firm's conflicts with him when he moved to a different firm, the costs
to the second firm of hiring that attorney would be enormous because the
second firm would have to turn away much more work on conflicts
grounds. A rule of absolute disqualification would thus greatly impair the
market for lateral hiring of attorneys. Not only would the rule impose a
significant cost on the attorney, but it would also reduce the efficiency of
the legal services market as a whole. Moreover, in most cases, C1 has little
to fear if the attorney in question has not, while at the first law firm,
personally worked on any issue involving C1. Under the imputed
disqualification rule, A would be barred from representing C2 while at the
first firm, whereas there is no significant danger to C1 if the new firm
represents C2-even if A himself is assigned to work on the new represen-
tation. If A had no involvement with Cl's affairs while at the former firm,
there is little danger that he will carry with him information damaging to
C1 when he changes firms. The parties, therefore, would not agree ex ante
to the application of an imputed disqualification rule in the case of A
moving between firms because A has much more to lose from such a rule
than C1 has to gain.
On the other hand, C1 does risk incurring significant costs if A has
worked on Cl's matters, or otherwise gained actual knowledge about Cl's
affairs, while working at the former firm and then moves to a firm that
represents C2. In such a case, it may be presumed that A does carry
50. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9(a) (1983).
51. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9 cmt. 1 2 (1983).
52. In arguing that the deteriorating quality of information is important in the func-
tioning of the rule, we do not mean to say that the rule should be understood to reflect solely
this consideration. As Stephen Gillers has pointed out, the rule also protects clients against
the danger that their lawyer will subsequently turn on them in a matter related to the former
representation, and thus enhances client confidence in attorneys ex ante. See Memorandum
from Stephen Gillers, supra note 25, at 6-7.
1001
HeinOnline -- 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1001 1996-1997
82 IOWA LAW REVIEW [1997]
information potentially damaging to Cl when he moves, and the parties, ex
ante, would likely agree that C1 should have veto power over the new
firm's continuing to represent C2 in such circumstances. However, because
A will no longer have access to Cl's files, and because the value of
information in A's hands deteriorates over time, the risks associated with
subsequent representation are less when the attorney has moved than
when he remains at his former firm. One might legitimately question the
efficiency of the rule of absolute disqualification of the second firm in this
case. If A's new firm implements procedures to control the transfer of
confidential information about the C1 representation between A and other
attorneys at the firm, and, if A is barred from any participation in the C2
representation at the new firm, it might be more efficient to allow the new
firm to represent C2, subject to the creation of adequate firewalls to
control the risk to C1 due to A's prior representation.
The Model Rules adjust these competing considerations in a sensible
fashion, providing that
[a] lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or
a substantially related matter in which the firm with which the
lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person;
and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired [confidential]
information ... that is material to the matter;
unless the former client consents after consultation. 3
The analysis presented above suggests that this is exactly the type of rule
that A and C1 would agree to if they were bargaining about the matter ex
ante.
We also concluded that, as a theoretical matter, C1 should not be able
to assert the right to bar an attorney from a case if C1 has deliberately
delayed interposing an objection in order to achieve economic leverage
against the attorney (or, more realistically in most cases, against the
attorney's current client). This appears to be consonant with current
practice, under which courts facing disqualification motions in litigation
are increasingly skeptical about the bona fides of the parties seeking
disqualification and increasingly attuned to the possibility that the disquali-
fication motion is being used for strategic purposes, rather than to protect
the former client against a real and substantial risk of harm. 4
Finally, we concluded that an optimal system of default rules would
include sanctions in addition to disqualifying A if he inappropriately repre-
53. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9(b) (1983).
54. See Kenneth L Penegar, The Loss of Innocence: A Brief History of Law Firm Disqualification
in the Courts, 8 Geo.J. Legal Ethics 831, 856-67 (1995) (noting the rise in the use of motions
to disqualify for pragmatic purposes since the 1970s).
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sents C2 without Cl's consent. The rules of legal ethics do in fact impose
such an additional level of sanctions, as the attorney found to have
engaged in an impermissible conflict of interest is subject to serious
penalties, including loss of reputation, license suspension, or even
disbarment-sanctions sufficient to make attorneys think twice about
engaging in inappropriate conflicts of interest or disclosing client secrets
or confidences to third parties.
In general, therefore, economic analysis suggests that the current
rules of attorney ethics are efficient rules to which the parties would agree
if they were to bargain ex ante. However, there are two respects in which
the conflicts of interest rules, or the overall regime in which the rules are
understood, might be critiqued from an economic perspective. First, the
professional codes are to some extent in conflict with the economic
analysis in their treatment of consent. Nothing in the rules suggests that C1
and A are expected to engage in negotiation for consent to subsequent
representations. The implicit model is one in which A approaches C1 and
asks for permission. One might wonder, however, why C1 would grant this
permission, thereby giving up a potentially valuable asset (the right to bar
A from representing C2) without receiving something of value in return.
The relationship between lawyer and client is, in many cases, strictly a
matter of business, often big business-the lawyer or law firm may bill the
client for millions of dollars a year. It would appear unrealistic to expect
that clients dealing at arm's length with lawyers-especially, as will often be
the case in conflict of interest situations, lawyers who no longer represent
them-will simply give away this valuable asset very often.55
The idea that attorneys should be allowed to pay clients for the right
to engage in conflicting representation might seem grossly inappropriate
from the standpoint of traditional conceptions of the lawyer's role. The
fact of the matter, however, is that if the attorney is not allowed to pay
directly, one of two inefficient events is likely to happen: either A will pay
indirectly, for example, by acknowledging to C1 that he "owes him one"
and by performing favors or below-cost services for C1 in the future, or A
will not seek Cl's permission and simply conduct the subsequent
representation, on the theory that C1 would probably deny it. Neither of
these outcomes is particularly desirable, especially because an efficient
outcome can be achieved with a market approach. One of our
recommendations for reform is to more explicitly recognize the utility of a
market-based solution to the conflict of interest problem. It should be
considered appropriate for attorneys to compensate their clients or former
clients for the right to engage in conflicting representation of other clients.
55. It may be that, in a particular industry, companies would adopt the practice of giving
permission pursuant to an industry-wide norm that such permissions are ordinarily granted.
Such practices may currently exist, although we do not know of any; however, they are likely
to prove unstable over time because of the temptations firms will face to opt out of the
practice in order to obtain compensation from attorneys.
1003
HeinOnline -- 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1003 1996-1997
82 IOWA LAW REVIEW [1997]
A second aspect of the current rules that might be challenged from
an economic perspective is their implication that some conflicts of interest
are so severe that even a fully informed, rational, and sophisticated client
could never effectively consent to them. Model Code DR 5-105(C) goes
farthest in this direction, requiring that it be "obvious" that A "can
adequately represent the interest of each [client]."5 Apparently, under
the Model Code, it would not be enough for both clients to consent after
full disclosure and due deliberation unless it was also "obvious" that A can
adequately represent both. Aside from the defects of draftsmanship
here-When is something "obvious"? To whom must it be "obvious?-this
provision goes too far in the direction of imposing a mandatory term,
rather than respecting the agreement of the parties. If the parties have
made a full, free and voluntary choice to allow a subsequent representa-
tion, notwithstanding the presence of a conflict of interest, it should be
conclusively presumed that the representation can proceed, at least in the
absence of significant third-party effects.
The newer Model Rules mitigate this flaw, but they do not eliminate it
entirely. The Model Rules drop the unfortunate "obvious" language, but
still maintain a provision that can bar representation independently of
client consent: not only must C1 consent after consultation, but it must
also be the case that A "reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client."5 7 It is doubtful that
this provision has much bite, however, as it still leaves the determination
up to A and requires only that A have a reasonable belief. Nevertheless,
there remains the possibility that this clause could be used to challenge a
subsequent representation that had been fully and voluntarily agreed to by
the parties, on the ground that A's belief that no conflicts of interest exist
was not "reasonable." It is difficult to justify this rule in economic terms,
however, especially given the fruitful opportunities it seems to offer for ex
post opportunism on the part of unscrupulous clients."s
CONCLUSION
In the conflicts of interest area, the applicable ethics rules adopt a
remarkably sensible system of background rules to govern the attorney-
client relationship, subject only to a number of quibbles which, while not
insignificant, are relatively minor in the scheme of things. Why would the
bar-a group of attorneys-promote and enforce a system of regulation so
56. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105(C) (1981).
57. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(a) (1) (1983).
58. Stephen Gillers observed that there may be greater justification for a rule of
nonwaivable conflicts in the criminal context, namely whether a defendant may want to waive
a conflict that would threaten the integrity of a verdict by impeaching the independence of
counsel. Memorandum from Stephen Gillers, supra note 25, at 8-9. This is a valid point, but it
is limited in scope to certain criminal contexts and does not affect the general run of cases
treated in this paper.
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apparently consonant with the public interest? Simply because, in this
matter, the bar's interests are generally aligned with the interests of the
public at large. We may assume that very few attorneys have an interest in
systematically harming clients by engaging in conflict of interest repre-
sentations to which the clients would not agree ex ante. There is little
constituency in the bar in favor of a system of conflicts regulations that
deviate systematically from the optimal default rules. Quite to the contrary,
most lawyers would prefer a regulatory system that adopted reasonable
default rules in the area of conflicts of interest, as such rules increase the
joint product of the attorney-client relationship-an increase in wealth in
which attorneys as well as clients can share. Effectively, the existing conflict
of interest rules reduce the costs of attorney-client contracting by supplying
reasonably efficient default rules that apply in case the parties have not
specified the terms of their agreement on the point.
Where the rules deviate most clearly from economic efficiency, we
may speculate that the bar gains more in public relations than it loses in
revenues. It is doubtful that these rules have much real-world impact; there
are very few cases where a representation was found to be inappropriate
notwithstanding the client's informed consent. On the other hand, having
these paternalistic-sounding rules in place reflects the bar's concern for the
public welfare, and thus provides some defense to the widespread public
belief that attorneys routinely take undue advantage of their clients.
What remains somewhat mysterious to us is why we do not seem to
observe more instances of market transactions in which attorneys pay
clients for the privilege of engaging in a conflicting regulation. Although
such a market would face obstacles to effective operation-negotiating a
price may be difficult, and it may be awkward for an attorney and client to
bargain with each other in a situation in which their interests have become
adversarial-these difficulties do not appear insurmountable. For example,
the parties could agree ex ante to appoint a trusted neutral party who
would be charged with determining the price, if any, that the client would
charge for granting permission to engage in the representation. We
imagine that deals of this type are sometimes struck (perhaps, with C2,
rather than A, performing the bargaining), but that when they are
reached, the parties do not publicize them. These deals probably take the
form of an implicit promise for a return of a favor, rather than an explicit
market transaction with cash compensation. Alternatively, C2 may agree to
give up or settle claims against C1 in exchange for Cl's permission to the
representation. Exploring the frequency with which such transactions occur
and the terms negotiated by the parties might be a fruitful avenue for
future research.
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